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ITALY: POPULIST IN THE MIRROR, (DE)POLITICIZING THE COVID-19 FROM 
GOVERNMENT AND OPPOSITION 
 
Abstract 
This chapter focuses on the Italian case, and it addresses two different populist parties – 5 Star 
Movement and League – that played different roles during the pandemic crisis. Whilst the League 
was in opposition, the M5S was serving in government. As a consequence the two populist parties 
developed very diverse communication strategy for handling the crisis. The League struggled to adapt 
its traditional populist claims to the pandemic emergency, while the M5S in line with other 
mainstream parties addressed the crisis by emphasising the institutional role played. In general, the 
COVID-19 outbreak defused the relevance of some populist issues among citizens and within 
political debate. Specifically, the League was not able to set the agenda or to claim the ownership on 
any of the issues under discussion, by contrast the M5S had the chance to manage the crisis and 
preserving its relevance within the political scenario. 
 
ARTURO BERTERO, University of Turin (arturo.bertero@edu.unito.it) 
ANTONELLA SEDDONE, University of Turin 
 
Introduction 
The identification of a pandemic outbreak in Italy at the end of February 2020 was unanticipated. 
Despite the concern for what was happening in the Hubei province, coronavirus disease 2019 
(COVID-19) was considered a specifically ‘Chinese problem’. This was an incorrect assumption. 
Even when the first Italian cases were diagnosed, there was still no awareness of the seriousness of 
the upcoming emergency. Italian politics was unprepared for this shock and consequently had to 
redefine their strategies. In this respect, being in opposition or in government determined different 
opportunities and challenges. This chapter investigated the diverse role played by the two most 
prominent Italian populist parties in the first 4 months of the emergency: the League (Lega) and the 
Five Star Movement (M5S, Movimento 5 Stelle). The League attempted to adapt to the emergency 
to its usual populist strongholds. Conversely, the M5S, as a government party, emphasised its 
responsiveness by appealing for national unity and claiming the ownership for those actions of the 
government providing direct support to citizens. 
 
 
1. Political context 
Italy has been described as the ‘promised land’ of populism (Tarchi, 2015) or as its ‘breeding ground’ 
(Bobba & Legnante, 2016) because of the durable success of its populist parties. The emergence of 
the Northern League (LN, Lega Nord) in the late 1980s and the unexpected performance of 
Berlusconi at the head of Go Italy (FI, Forza Italia) in the early 1990s represented the first steps of 
populism’s recent history in Italy. The success of the M5S since 2013 has expanded the variety of 
populism, including parties not belonging to the right. Although in the past, Berlusconi has been 
described as the champion of the Italian ‘neoliberal populism’ (Mudde & Rovira Kaltvasser, 2017), 
in the last few years, he adopted less populist positions (Mazzoleni & Bracciale, 2018; see also 2019 
Chapel Hill expert survey) to the extent of describing himself as the only opponent of the populist 
threat during the 2018 general elections (Roncarolo & Cremonesi ,2019)19. Currently, the M5S and 
the League are indisputably not only the two most important populist parties but also amongst the 
main key players in Italian politics. Although in 2018 they supported a coalition government together, 
 
19Notably, a new right-wing party, Fratelli d’Italia (FDI, Brothers of Italy), is probably qualified to be called a populist. 
However, considering the lesser relevance than of the M5S and the League, it was not included in this chapter because 
of space constraints. 
 
 
they are profoundly different in terms of political histories, political programmes and belongingness 
in varieties of populism. 
 
The M5S was formally founded in 2009 by Beppe Grillo, an Italian comedian, and the late web 
entrepreneur Gianroberto Casaleggio. The 2013 Italian general election was a turning point for the 
party. In its first national electoral campaign, it had striking success: Grillo’s anti-political style 
resonated well with Italians’ deep distrust for the political class. A quarter of Italian voters (25.56%) 
cast their ballot for the M5S that entered the Italian Parliament as an opposition party. The 
transformation of Grillo’s movement into a proper institutional political actor was completed during 
the 2013–2018 legislature. In 2018, the M5S approached the Italian elections as an experienced 
political party ready to take up posts in government. After the step back of its founder, the M5S party 
membership formally appointed Luigi Di Maio as the new leader of the movement with full 
responsibility for leading the party through the 2018 election campaign. The result was gratifying: 
the party was confirmed as Italy’s most popular with 32.7% of the vote. During this period, the M5S 
has combined its clear anti-establishment rhetoric with a blurry ideological positioning. Although 
initially the movement espoused a vaguely leftist ideology (D’Alimonte, 2019: 120), after its success 
in the 2013 general election (see Tronconi, 2015), the party started to shift its positioning on the 
political spectrum. The blurring of its left–right positioning has caused several political scholars to 
describe the party as having a post-ideological profile that is ‘beyond left and right classification’ 
(Tarchi, 2015). 
 
The League is the heir of the Northern League, an ethno-regionalist party founded by the charismatic 
figure of Umberto Bossi who promoted secessionist or federalist policies to favour Northern regions 
(Albertazzi & McDonnell, 2010). In 2013, major changes in the party organisation led to the 
appointment of a new leader, Matteo Salvini. This shift at the head of the party entailed an ideological 
re-definition. Whilst Bossi’s LN was right-leaning and regionally based, Salvini’s League is a 
staunchly far-right populist party. As the party moved onto the national level, patriotism replaced 
regionalism, and the European Union (EU) and immigrants replaced Rome and Southern Italians as 
the people’s enemy (D’Alimonte 2019: 122). The party has increasingly focused on immigration, 
national identity and law and order issues (Albertazzi et al., 2018; Bobba, 2019). This new ideological 
stance and Salvini’s enthusiastic leadership have been highly rewarded by voters making the league 
the first party in the centre-right field. 
 
After a brief interlude where together the M5S and The League supported the first Conte 
government—the honeymoon lasted only 1 year. In August 2019, Salvini withdrew his support—the 
movement decided to form a second Conte government with the support of the left-wing Partito 
Democratico (Democratic Party). The COVID-19 crisis finds the two parties in a mirror situation: the 
M5S is in power but with a low approval rate; the League is instead in opposition but with a growing 
number of voters. 
 
Table 4.1 Main Italian political parties (> 5% in the last General election) 
Political party General election 2018 European Election 2019 
 Vote shares Seats Vote shares Seats 
In power     
Five Star Movement 32.7 133 17.1 14 
Democratic Party 18.8 86 22.7 19 
In opposition      
The League 17.4 73 34.3 29 





2. COVID-19 diffusion and political measures 
In Italy, there was no clue regarding the risk of an actual outbreak of the pandemic, during the first 
phase. The first measures taken by the Italian national government in the prevention of a possible 
spread of the COVID-19 within the country were issued in January. After the notice regarding a 
pandemic hitting the Hubei province, the World Health Organization as well as the European Centre 
for Disease Prevention and Control put out a warning but still indicated that there is a moderate risk 
of actual contagion across the European countries. The Italian government reacted through the 
establishment of a dedicated task force dealing with a possible health emergency20. In the absence of 
full-blown cases, the government’s actions focused on monitoring the transport of passengers and 
goods between Italy and China. At the end of January, after two Chinese tourists in Rome were 
diagnosed positive to the infection, the Minister of Health disposed the block of all flights from China. 
Furthermore, since all the (few) diagnosed cases had a strong and direct connection with China, the 
national government limited the use of diagnostic swabs only to patients who had contact with the 
Chinese outbreak. Basically, during this pre-COVID-19 phase, the risk of an actual outbreak in Italy 
was perceived as remote, simply requiring prevention and monitoring. 
 
However, very suddenly, Italy entered a second phase, when the presence of the virus was overt and 
the increasing contagion rates, as well as the pressure on the health system, revealed the very nature 
of the pandemic risk. It was precisely the absence of recent contact with China that triggered the 
alarm, when on 21 February, a young patient was diagnosed positive for COVID-19 in a small village, 
just outside Milan. A few days later, other patients were hospitalised in the nearby area with 
symptoms consistent with COVID-19; the same happened in a small centre in the Veneto region. 
COVID-19 was no more a Chinese problem. Because of the identification of two different outbreaks 
in Northern Italy, the government issued the first of an incremental set of measures aimed to contain 
the contagion. On 24 February, two red zones limited to the municipalities involved in the infection 
were identified, and the limitation of movement and the closure of non-essential services were lifted21. 
In about a week, the daily number of infected individuals doubled, and the pressure on hospitals and 
intensive care units increased leading the government to issue a second set of measures. On 1 March, 
the red zone was extended including basically most of the provinces of Northern Italy22. Considering 
the increasing pressure over the hospitals and intensive care units, as well as the scarcity of diagnostic 
swabs and the limited supply of individual protection devices to health workers, the national 
government on 11 March, 2020, decided to tighten the lockdown measures to all the Italian territory23. 
Particularly, the virus was hitting Northern Italy, but contagion cases were determined all over the 
country. A nationwide closure was specifically decided to prevent Southern regions—with structural 
deficits in health facilities—from rising contagion rates. All teaching activities in schools and 
universities were suspended; and bars, restaurants and shops except for those providing essential 
services (like food stores and pharmacies) were closed. Ten days later, due to the increasing contagion 
rate and the response to pressure from unions concerned about the safety of workers, the national 
government decided to further intensify the lockdown by shutting down all non-necessary businesses 
and industries. 
The third phase coincides with the mitigation of contagion, ensuing the lockdown end and the gradual 
reopening of the economic and production activities within the country. Formally, the closure was 
expected to end on 13 April, but it eventually came about ending on 4 May. Whilst the movement 
across regions was still forbidden, citizens were allowed to leave their homes to their visit relatives. 
Industrial plants, shops, bars and restaurants were allowed to open. Since 3 June, movement across 
regions was able to return to a semi-normal situation. Whilst schools and universities were still closed, 
 
20All the measures taken by the Italian government are available here: http://www.governo.it/it/coronavirus (last access: 
June 2020). 
21Decree Dpcm 23 febbraio 2020. 
22Decree Dpcm 1 marzo 2020. 
23Decree Dpcm 11 marzo 2020. 
 
 
the other activities gradually returned to normal, although limitations concerning social distancing 
remained. 
 
Figure 4.1 Daily death toll and new cases in Italy  
 
Source: European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control 
Phase 1: pre-Covid-19; Phase 2: spread and containment measures; Phase 3: contagion mitigation 
 
Table 4.2 COVID-19 pandemic in Italy 
Cases 235,561 
Total death 34,043 
Total recovered 168,646 
Cases for 1M pop 3,896 
Deaths for 1M pop 563 
Source: https://www.worldometers.info/coronavirus/ (update 10/6/2020) 
 
 
3. Populist discourse at the time of COVID-19 
The M5S and the League faced the period of the COVID-19 pandemic from opposite institutional 
positions with different duties and opportunities. As a major government party, the Movement was 
called to take prompt decisions to respond to the crisis; in opposition, the League continued to criticise 
the government, although its flagship proposals appeared undermined in a political field entirely 
absorbed by the health crisis. These two general patterns differently impacted on their populist 
discourse and on the variation of the key elements within it. 
 
The M5S usually adopts a Manichean vision of society and refers to ‘the people’ as the honest citizens 
who are committed to fighting the corrupt system. During the pandemic, this view slightly changed 
becoming more inclusive and less based on divisive issues: all the Italians have to be protected and 
saved, whereas politics should be united for facing such a situation. This attitude was evident in 
several Di Maio’s statements highly sympathetic with the Italians: ‘I read you and understand all 
your difficulties. This damned virus has upset our days, our lives, but we are reacting and this is 
important. […] Let’s prove we are a great people’ (Di Maio’s Facebook page, 29/03/20). The crisis 
also allows the Movement to reiterate the relevance of citizenship income by stating that ‘politics 
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faults of their own’ (Di Maio’s interview, Guerra e Pace, 17/04/20, TV2000). The conception of the 
people of the League is also inclusive. As Di Maio, Salvini also showed empathy with the Italians 
and has fuelled their pride. However, ‘the people’ is always defined in contrast with the elites or the 
outgroups. In these respects, the pandemic crisis did not change much the way the League exalted the 
sovereignty of the Italian State or his leader claimed to represent and defend Italian people. 
 
Certainly, the arguments used by the League for blaming ‘the elites’ have changed. Although the 
targeted elites are still the same—the Italian ruling class and the EU—the list of charges has been 
updated. The uncertain situation offered an opportunity to blame the government for whatever. 
Particularly, it is accused of endangering the Italian people by being incompetent in the management 
of the health emergency: in January, the League protested that Italy had not closed its borders before 
the outbreak of the pandemic, whilst in Easter (6 April) the stated measures had to be relaxed to allow, 
for example, people to go to church24. Similarly, all the government efforts made for responding to 
the economic crisis were considered systematically insufficient to portray an argument for individual 
stories of people in need (i.e. ‘I have the mailbox, Messenger, WhatsApp and mobile phone full of 
messages from Italians—merchants, entrepreneurs, self-employed, freelancers, families and workers 
in general—who despite government decrees and promises have not yet received a euro refund’, 
Salvini’s Facebook page, 08/04/20). The second favourite target of the League, the EU institutions, 
are usually accused of being inadequate and serving the interests of other countries. In the light of the 
COVID-19 crisis, these charges are specified in the delay of the EU reaction to the pandemic and 
then shifted especially on the European Stability Mechanism (ESM), claimed as insufficient and 
unfair, conceived at the detriment of the Italian people (‘ESM approved: outside the law, dictature in 
the name of the virus [...] Since 1989 Italy has paid 140 billion to Europe, now to borrow 35 billion 
we have to accept a system of a legalized loan sharking system’25). Although anti-elitism is a central 
feature of the M5S discourse, the targeted elites changed during the crisis. The issue of corruption 
and the wasting of public funds are temporarily set aside. In the initial phase of the pandemic, Di 
Maio blamed the international media—one of the long-time targets of the Movement—for creating a 
climate of fear and hatred towards Italy. Moreover, some critics were moved toward the EU. Unlike 
what Salvini did (and the Movement too in the past), these are not attacks but rather firm stances on 
the need for economic and financial aid to resolve the crisis (‘We are a people who have always given 
to the European Union, now is the time to receive. As Italy today we are fighting a war against an 
invisible enemy and Europe must help us’. Di Maio’s interview, TG1, 26/03/20). Notably, this attempt 
at dialogue with an archetypal elite such as the EU is probably strategic, mainly due to the M5S’s 
position in power and Di Maio’s role as foreign minister. The need to offer a responsive and effective 
image determined also the reframe of the M5S’s indulgence with anti-science claims. Lining up with 
the government coalition’s partner, indeed, the Movement is committed and supportive of science. 
Consequently, those formerly labelled as elites—such as experts, pharmaceutical industries and 
mainstream scientists generally—became swiftly the only trustworthy referents leading the 
government actions against the virus (i.e. ‘There is a scientific committee that will tell the government 
when we can return to normality’26). This is particularly relevant because, on the other side, Salvini 
has exploited this populist argument by winking more than once to conspiracy theories about the 
origin of the virus and effective treatment methods against COVID-19 kept hidden by pharmaceutical 
companies (Salvini’s Twitter account, 05/05/20). 
 
The third element of populism – ‘the outgroups’ – only refers to the League. The M5S, even when in 
government with the League, never really developed anti-migrant or discriminatory positions towards 
ethnic–religious minorities or the LGBT community. By contrast, as containment measures became 
 
24M. Cremonesi, Riaprire le chiese a Pasqua? Tutti contro Salvini (cattolici compresi). Corriere della Sera, 05/04/20. 
25Eurogruppo, Salvini: ‘C’è il Mes, così è ipoteca sul futuro’. Meloni: ‘Vincono Germania e Olanda’. Il Messaggero, 
09/04/20. 
26Di Maio, riaprire? Ce lo diranno esperti. ANSA, 01/04/20. 
 
 
more severe, Salvini insisted on the frame of the ‘uncontrolled immigration’. He counterposed the 
honest and law-abiding Italian people to irregular migrants and foreign drug dealers, who commit 
crimes or who continue to land without any health control (‘The government deploys Army and Police 
to control and fine Italians, but illegal immigrants continue to land…’. Salvini’s Twitter account, 
27/03/20). This element, particularly in its ‘law and order’ variant, was weakened in the lockdown 
phase when the entire population was asked to stay at home and, consequently, the volume of 
common crimes (such as theft, robbery and drug dealing) decreased by 64%27. 
 
4. The politicization of COVID-19 issue by populists 
The differences in how the two populist parties ‘name, blame and claim’ (Felstiner, Abel & Sarat, 
1981) of the health crisis relate mainly to the different roles played within the political landscape. 
 
In the emergence phase, precisely when the COVID-19 pandemic appeared just as a Chinese problem, 
the League immediately recognised the issue as a ground for applying its usual populist rhetoric. The 
naming of the virus points at the risk of contagion and the safeguard of Italian people. However, the 
League entered the issue in the political debate as one of the political arms to accuse the government. 
In this regard, it was used to revolve around the immigration problem, emphasising the need to close 
the border to foreign arrivals (i.e. ‘Given that the Coronavirus emergency unfortunately is still high 
and concerning, a serious government should INTENSIFY controls on those arriving in Italy rather 
than proposing a policy for opening seaports’. Salvini’s Facebook page, 21/02/20) 
 
The M5S, given its role in government, coped with the pandemic emergency differently. The 
movement and the government as a whole adopted the strategy of delaying the politicisation of the 
issue by resorting to technical and scientific knowledge. The issue is thus addressed in terms of 
responsive actions for protecting Italian people from the COVID-19 contagion. The M5S named the 
COVID-19 issue as political only when the Italians outbreak was identified and the contagion rate 
certified the seriousness of the epidemic. Confronted with the growing pressure over the health 
system, the Movement changed its approach by asking other political parties for national unity and 
justifying the need for severe containment measures adopted as the only possible solution (i.e. the 
state in all its parts is working hard to cope with the Coronavirus epidemic. And I believe that in 
these moments it is necessary to show unity and compactness […] a politics with sense of 
responsibility is needed, which must look each other in the eye and think first of all about the interest 
of the citizens)28. 
 
Lockdown measures contributed to a decrease in pressure on intensive care units and concerns about 
the endurance of the health system. It is precisely at this moment that the Lega shifted into the 
confrontation phase, blaming the EU and national government for the management of the emergency. 
As the contagions grew, the short- and long-term consequences of the crisis became increasingly 
evident both in social and economic respects. The EU is accused of being silent or making vague 
promises whilst ‘a lot of money is needed, immediately’ (Salvini’s Facebook page 10/03/20). 
Regarding the national government, the nature of the League criticism is less definite. The seriousness 
of the pandemic impeded an open criticism over the lockdown measures. Therefore, the field of battle 
was organised around the economic consequences of the emergency and the lack of adequate 
economic support for citizens. However, identifying a specific issue on which the League had proved 
the ownership is difficult. Rather, the party focused its attention on a wide list of claims (and 
grievances), ranging from the incapability of the national government to provide adequate support 
for regional health systems to the bureaucratic constraints set by the government measures in support 
of citizens facing economic difficulties due to the lockdown. Similarly, the government was blamed 
 
27Grignetti, F. Tutti a casa per il coronavirus, crollano i reati del 64%. La Stampa, 20/03/20. 
28Coronavirus, Di Maio: ‘Bisogna mostrare unità e compattezza’. Adnkronos, 21/02/20. 
 
 
for its leniency toward the EU by suggesting its interest in the ESM, perceived as an attempt from the 
EU institutions to force Italy to austerity policies and reforms (‘If they can find 15 billion for Africa 
and to Italy they can only say ‘Either you get the ESM, putting yourself in a cage, or there is nothing 
for you’. If so, I understand those mayors who lowered the flag of Europe, of an institution that is 
proving to be aloof. This is not the European Union, it’s the German Union’. Salvini’s Facebook 
page, 08/04/20). 
 
The confrontation phase was instead addressed through a passive strategy by the M5S, having little 
chance of blaming anyone. The political scope of the measures implemented by the government was 
weakened and immediately justified by the technical–scientific committee of the Civil Protection 
Department. However, after the European Central Bank refused to issue extraordinary measures in 
support of countries suffering from financial speculation due to the pandemic, the M5S—along with 
other government parties—engaged in a heated debate with the EU institutions that marked the 
culmination of this phase. Controversies were healed only after the official commitment of the Head 
of the EU Commission to provide financial assistance to countries, easing the EU financial 
requirements and launching a series of funding schemes for economic recovery. The opening of the 
EU on this field, particularly regarding flexibility over the domestic budget, was claimed to be a 
success for the government and again the M5S has softened its traditional diffidence over the EU29. 
 
As pertains to the managing phase of the COVID-19 issue, we could identify two different levels of 
policy interventions. The first one relates to the measures aimed to contain the contagion spread. The 
second one focuses on the consequences at the economic level. Indeed, the lockdown measures 
implied a stop to industrial production along with a dramatic fall in consumer spending, determining 
a negative outlook for the Italian economy with an expected collapse of the Italian GDP for 2020. 
Gradually, as the contagion rate started to decrease, particularly in Southern regions, the concerns for 
the health risk shifts on the economic dimension, putting this latter at the core of the political agenda. 
Besides the support for companies and enterprises, further measures were delivered. Since the 
beginning of the emergency, the government suspended all ongoing layoff procedures, introducing a 
mechanism of redundancy funds paid directly with public money. These measures were integrated 
with actions in support of freelancers and those categories of workers lacking protection. Incidentally, 
these measures were in line with the cornerstone of the original M5S’s policy platform—the basic 
income. Easily, the party was able to claim ownership. Regarding the League, triggering the 
politicisation of the COVID-19 emergency becomes quite arduous, and the party failed in getting the 
ownership of a recognisable topic. Relying on the usual populist claims—blaming migrants and the 
EU elites—was not sufficient to set the agenda during the health crisis, even less during the recovery 
phase when policy proposals were under discussion. Lacking a recognisable strategy, except for 





Understanding whether the COVID-19 pandemic has damaged or rather benefited populists in Italy 
is not easy. Whilst the League played this game in opposition, the M5S had an essential role in the 
management of the crisis. Their institutional role entailed a diverse communication strategy for 
handling the crisis. Whilst the League tried (with difficulties) to adapt its traditional populist claims 
to the pandemic emergency, the M5S in line with other mainstream parties addressed the crisis by 
emphasising the institutional role played. Additionally, the media did not offer an easy ground for 
classic populist rhetoric. The health emergency—meaning the data on contagion rates, deaths and 
pressure over the system—and the nature of the pandemic did not need any further media logic 
 
29D’Argenio, A., Coronavirus, Von der Leyen: ‘La Ue deve scusarsi con l’Italia’. la Repubblica, 16/04/20. 
 
 
elements such as negativity and sensationalism. Consequently, populist claims were dampened and 
eventually marginalised in media coverage. 
 
Indicators of this shift could be voting intentions in the polls and the relevance that populists had in 
the public debate and political field, before and after the start of the crisis. 
 
Regarding the polls, the results showed that the League decreased its support during this period (from 
32% in January to 27% in May), whereas the M5S has managed to keep its result almost consistent, 
approximately 15%–16%30. Obviously, these results cannot be attributed only to the crisis. Many 
other intervening factors could have affected it; however, it is a matter of a fact that the League in 
this period, for whatever reason, has suffered a loss of consent. Regarding the political and public 
relevance of these parties, the evidence discussed in this chapter showed that the League and the M5S 
have had different reactions to the crisis. The main populist flagships of the League, such as anti-
immigration claims or law and order proposals, have been weakened because of the ubiquity of the 
COVID-19 issue. Salvini tried to politicise the issue, particularly blaming the EU; however, his 
agenda-setting power has been much less strong than before the crisis. The M5S also modifies its 
populist discourse, leaving out usual populist topics—such as political corruption, waste of public 
money or suspicions about science and big pharma—and focusing, instead, on managing and 
responding to the crisis. 
 
All in all, this unusual crisis did not strengthen populist parties. By contrast, it defused some populist 
issues in the public opinion and political debate, on which Salvini held ownership. This happened 
also to the M5S, although in a peculiar way: having to face the pandemic has indeed limited the 
populist stances of the Movement which, in the face of new, crucial institutional responsibilities, 
adopted more mainstream positions. Although these changes are certainly temporary, they will likely 
be the new starting point for a reframe of the populist supply and a redefinition of the Italian political 
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